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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
INJUNCTION IN THE SUPREME COURT.
IN THE recent case of State ex rel. Lofthus et al. v. William
Langer, Attorney General,' the supreme court of North Dakota,
by a majority of three to two, and in the exercise of a supposed
original jurisdiction removed a receiver of a private state bank
who had been appointed by the State Banking Board, made an
adjudication, upon proof furnished by affidavits merely, that the
bank was not in fact insolvent, ordered it to be placed in the hands
of another receiver to be by him, and when he saw fit, returned
to its original officers and directors, and permanently enjoined the
attorney general and the State Banking Board from thereafter
interfering with its affairs.
The case is remarkable because in it a final injunction
restraining state officers was issued upon affidavits merely. It
is remarkable because the injunction was directed against the
attorney general himself, although in North Dakota and in many
other states it was for a long time, if not still, a mooted question
whether the so-called quasi-prerogative writ of injunction could
ever be issued by the supreme court, without the consent of the
attorney general and it has never before been decided that it could
be directed against him. It is remarkable since it furnishes the
first instance in North Dakota, and perhaps in any other state,
where this writ has been issued to impede and not help public
officials in the performance of their duties and especially where
private interests alone have been involved.
In addition to the question of the manifest impropriety of
deciding a case of this nature upon affidavits alone, the contro-
versy involves the question as to how far and over what matters
the original jurisdiction of the supreme court extends.
The bank is an ordinary private state bank which was organ-
ized under the general banking laws and must not be confused
with the Bank of North Dakota, which perhaps is more or less
publicly owned, though the recent decision of District Judge W.
L. Nuessie in the case of State ex rel. Kositzky v. Bank of North
Dakota2 has thrown sonie doubt even upon that question.
1 (N. D. 1919) 174 N. W. -
2 North Dakota district court.
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It is true that the dominant political faction or party of the
state is heavily interested in the local institution both as a borrow-
er and as a depositor, but political parties or factions are not yet
in law at any rate synonymous with the state itself, nor are their
interests the interests of the sovereign people. The only concern
therefore that the state as a whole can have in the affair must lie
in the fact that the so-called Bank of North Dakota has had deal-
ings with the local institution and holds among its collateral post-
dated checks which were received from it and in the fact that the
relator is the state bank examiner and that the receiver sought to
be removed happens to be one of his deputies.
Chapter 55 of the North Dakota Session Laws of 1911 creat-
ed a Department of Banking or State Banking Board and pro-
vided that the state examiner should be its secretary. This offi-
cer, if in the legal sense of the term officer he be, is at the present
time the relator Lofthus. Though he has the title of bank exam-
iner, he has no independent powers. Though under the Act of
1911 he is allowed deputies, and it is made his duty to examine
the books and accounts of the various state banking institutions,
he is to do so merely for the purpose of reporting to his superiors,
and he has been expressly held to be an agent of the Banking
Board and not an independent officer.3 Section 3 of the statute
provides that:
"The said board is hereby vested with the power and authority
to appoint by its own order, receivers for insolvent corporations
as defined in this article, and such receivers shall have the same
power and authority, and their acts the same validity as if
appointed under and by direction of a district court, but nothing
herein contained shall be construed so as to take away from the
courts the power to appoint receivers of such institutions at any
stage of the proceedings and thus terminate the receivership
ordered by the board."
Acting under these statutes and after an examination by a
deputy bank examiner and a report of insolvency, the State Bank-
ing Board ordered the institution closed and placed a deputy bank
examiner in charge as a receiver. This was done during the
absence from the state of the chief bank examiner himself, though
there is but little in this point as the examiner is merely an agent
of the board. The deputy however was persona non grata to the
bank and to its friends while the chief was not and the insolvency
of the institution was denied. It was therefore determined to
3 Youmans v. Hanna, (1916) 35 N. D. 479, 160 N. W. 705.
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resort to the courts and either to have the receivership entirely
dissolved or the bank examiner substituted in the place of his
deputy.
Naturally and ordinarily the proceedings would and should
have been instituted in the district court at Fargo, as not only had
this court unquestioned jurisdiction in the premises, but the act
under which the receiver was apponited seemed clearly to recog-
nize the district court and the district court alone by pioviding
that the receivers appointed by the board "shall have the power
and authority and their acts shall have the same validity as if
appointed under and by direction of a district court," and it is
fair to assume that the courts afterwards referred to in the
statute and to which resort should be had if a change of receivers
was desired were courts of the same nature and jurisdiction. For
some reason or other, possibly because the judge of the Fargo
District has rendered an unfavorable decision in a former bank-
ing case of almost equal notoriety,4 the chief examiner and the
state bank did not desire to submit the decision to him. They
therefore chose to petition the supreme court to take original
jurisdiction of the case and applied for a writ of injunction which
should restrain all interference with the affairs of the bank, and
this both on the ground that the bank examiner had not been
consulted in the premises and that the bank was not in fact insol-
vent.
A temporary injunction was issued and an order to show
cause why this injunction should not be made permanent and
the permanent injunction has now been issued. The decree,
however, seems to recognize the fact that the affairs of the bank
need some supervision, as it continues in charge the chief exam-
iner who in the temporary order had been substituted for his
deputy, and leaves it to him to turn the bank over to its original
owners when he shall see fit to do so.
The supreme court of Nortlh Dakota therefore assumed juris-
diction not only to substitute one receiver for another, but to pass
upon the solvency of the bank and the merits of the controversy,
and to enjoin the attorney general and the Banking Board. as a
whole from interfering in the premises, and this was done on
affidavits merely and against the protest of the attorney general
who demanded a full hearing.
4Youmans v. Hanna, (1916) 35 N. D. 479, 160 N. W. 705.
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The main question, however, as we have before said is a
question of jurisdiction.
The constitution of North Dakota provides that:
"Art. 4. Sec. 86. The Supreme Court, except as otherwise
provided in this constitution shall have appellate jurisdiction only,
which shall be co-extensive with the state, and shall have a gen-
eral superintending control over all inferior courts under such
regulations and limitations as may be prescribed by law.
"Sec. 87. It shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus,
mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, injunction and such other
original and remedial writs as may be necessary to the proper
exercise of its jurisdiction, and shall have authority to hear and
determine the same."
The questions at issue were: could the writs provided for in
section 87, only be issued in aid of an appellate jurisdiction, for
instance to require the clerk of a district court to send up the
records on an appeal, or did the supreme court have an original
jurisdiction outside of these matters and inherit the powers of
the English Court of King's Bench as far as the common law
writs of mandamus, habeas corpus, quo warranto and certiorari
were concerned, and in addition the power (which the Court of
King's Bench seems never to have possessed) to issue a quasi
prerogative writ of injunction in chancery? If the supreme court
had this power could it be exercised in any case except where the
sovereignty, public rights, franchises and prerogatives of the state
as a whole were concerned, and if not, did the bank controversy
involve such sovereignty, public rights, franchises or preroga-
tives? Could the writ be issued when the law officer of the state
not only disapproved but was himself the principal defendant?
The first North Dakota case upon the subject is that of State
of North Dakota v. Nelson County.5 In it, although the action
was brought by the attorney general himself, an injunction was
denied which sought to restrain the county from issuing seed
grain bonds for the purpose of furnishing seed to needy farmers
and this on the ground that the matter was of local interest mere-
ly. It was the intention of section 87 of the state constitution,
the court said:
"To confer upon the supreme court, in the exercise of a
jurisdiction vested in it, the duty of taking original cognizance
only in the limited class of cases where the writs, except the writ
of habeas corpus, are sought for on motion of the attorney gen-
s(1890) 1 N. D. 88, 45 N. W. 33.
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eral as prerogative writs. Except in the case of habeas corpus
leave to file and information must be obtained by the attorney
general. When the information makes out a prima facie case
the writ will issue only in cases publici juris, and those affecting
the sovereignty of the state, its franchises or prerogatives or the
liberties of its people."
These words are general, and through the application in the
particular case was for a writ of injunction, they in terms and
by way of dicta at any rate apply equally to the common law writs
of mandamus, quo warranto, and certiorari. The language, also,
is qualified and explained by the statement:
"The constitution of this state with respect to the original
jurisdiction of the supreme court is substantially the same as that
of the state of Wisconsin; and the interpretation given by the
supreme court of that state to that part of its state constitution
meets with the full approval of this court. See Attorney General
z. Railroad Companies, 35 Wisconsin 425; Attorney General v.
City of Eau Claire, 37 Wisconsin 400; Wheeler v. Irrigation
Company, 9 Colo. 248, 11 Pac. Rep. 103. The case at bar affects
only the local concerns of the county of Nelson, and its tax
payers, and hence does not fall within the limited class of cases'
indicated above, and in which alone this court will assume origi-
nal jurisdiction."
Thus, although there is in fact a difference between the con-
stitutions of Wisconsin and North Dakota,-the constitution of
the former state giving to the supreme court the general power
to issue the writs mentioned 6 while that of North Dakota gives
that court power only to issue the "writs of habeas corpus, man-
damus, quo warranto, certiorari, injunction and such other orig-
inal and remedial writs as may be necessary to the proper exer-
cise of its jurisdiction," and much more than that of Wisconsin
would seem to limit the power to a jurisdiction already pos-
sessed,-the Wisconsin rule was stated to have been adopted in
North Dakota.
As a matter of fact, however, the rule which was announced
in the earlier North Dakota decisions was even more strict than
that of the Wisconsin cases which had so far been decided.
Though indeed in the case of Attorney General v. Railroad Com-
panies7 Chief Justice Ryan had drawn a distinction between the
chancery writ of injunction and the common law and jurisdic-
tional writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto and cer-
tiorari, he had none the less held that it was the intention of the
6 See, sec. 3, art. vii.
T (1874) 35 Wis. 425.
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framers of the constitution, as far as the supreme court was con-
cerned, to make of the writ of injunction a quasi-prerogative andjurisdictional writ and to place it on a par with the unquestioned
high prerogative and jurisdictional common law writs, and a few
years later, in the case of State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham,8
the right of a private relator to petition for the writ of injunc-
tion was fully established.
The North Dakota court on the other hand, in the earlier
cases when the writ of injunction was prayed for, seemed to be
of the opinion, if not positively to hold, that the sanction of the
attorney general was absolutely necessary. Though therefore
we find in the North Dakota reports several instances where the
common law writs seem to have been issued without the consent
of the attorney general and even when the law officer of the state
not only disapproved but appeared in person to represent- the
defendants, 10 we find at least one case where the writ of injunc-
tion was asked under similar circumstances its issuance was per-
emptorily denied." Indeed it is but natural that the consent of the
*attorney general should at first have been deemed necessary. The'
writ was a high prerogative or at any rate quasi high prerogative
writ. Originally and in England the prerogative was the prerog-
ative of the throne and not of the private citizen, and the attorney
general was the representative of the throne. In America, where
the personal sovereign gave way to the sovereign people, the pre-
rogative was still a sovereign or governmental prerogative, and it
might well have been first contended that the law officer of the
state would best know when the exercise of that prerogative
was necessary and that he could be relied upon to petition for it
whenever the public welfare really demanded its issuance.
The purpose of the high prerogative writs was to aid in the
administration of government; and when the law and the govern-
ment proceeded from the king, and in America where (as was first
the case in North Dakota) there was a dominant political party
entrusted with the affairs of government, it was seldom that the
interests of the dominant party and of the attorney general were
other than to further the governmental agencies and machinery
and the workings of the established law. Occasions, however,
8 (1892) 83 Wis. 90, 53 N. W. 35, 17 L. R. A. 147, 35 Am. St Rep. 27.
9 State v. Nelson, (1890) 1 N. D. 88, 45 N. W. 33; Anderson v. Gor-don, (1900) 9 N. D. 480, 83 N. W. 993.10 State ex rel. Fosser v. Lavik, (1900) 9 N. D. 461, 83 N. W. 914;State ex rel. Anderson v. Falley, (1900) 9 N. -D. 464, 83 N. W. 913.11 Anderson v. Gordon, (1900) 9 N. D. 480, 83 N. W. 993.
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soon arose, when th6e: contest between the political factions be-
came close and keen and the attorney general himself became an
interested party. Such a case was presented in Wisconsin in the
leading case of State ex rel. Lamb v. Cltnni1ghWm,12 where a
democratic attorney general refused to ask for an injunction
which would prohibit the sending out of election notices under
a flagrantly unconstitutional statute which had so gerrymandered
the state as to disfranchise thousands of republican voters, and
it is but natural that the court should have then definitely stated
that, even in the case of an injunction, the consent of the attor-
ney general was not absolutely necessary to the exercise of juris-
diction and that in this respect there was no difference between
injunctions and common law writs.
Never before, however, either in Wisconsin or North Dakota,
has the supreme court asserted the right of not merely ignoring
the wishes of the attorney general but of enjoining this officer
himself from doing that which he believed his public duty de-
manded and especially in a case in which the relator represented
private and not public rights. It is one thing indeed for the
supreme court to take jurisdiction in a case where an injunction
is sought against a private individual or subordinate officer to
restrain him from interfering with the functioning of govern-
ment and another to bring the chief law officer of the state before
its bar and to prevent a state board from performing its duties.
The high prerogative jurisdiction indeed was given that the ad-
ministration of the government might be carried out and promot-
ed and not that it might be prevented and delayed.
Up fo the present time .the supreme courts of both Wisconsin
and North Dakota have steadily adhered to the rule that the
writ X'hich are authorized to be issued in the exercise of their
original jurisdiction are, no matter by what name they may be
called, strictly prerogative writs and that, for that reason, they
can only be issued when the interests of the state as a whole
and not of some mere individual or locality are concerned, no
matter how interesting to all the controversy may be. They
have taken jurisdiction therefore in the cases of controversies
over supreme court and district court judicial offices because
the people of the state as a whole are concerned in the proper
administration of the civil and criminal law. 13 They have as-
12 (1892) 83 Wis. 90, 53 N. W. 35, 17 L. R. A. 147, 35 Am. St. Rep. 27.
13 State ex rel. Erickson v. Burr, (1907) 16 N. D. 581, 113 N. W. 705;
State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, (1916) 35 N. D. 410, 160 N. W. 512.
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sumed jurisdiction in questions involving the right to the ballot
and of representation upon the electoral tickets because the right
to a free suffrage is one which it is the interest of all to preserve
and the election of even county officers is a part of the gen-
eral scheme of government. 14  They have assumed jurisdiction
where general elections were sought to be called under unconsti-
tutional laws and even where constitutional amendments were
sought to be unconstitutionally initiated. 5 They have always
been ready to interfere where public officers such as the state
tax commissioners were sought to be hindered in or prevented
from the performance of their duties.' 6
They have steadily refused to take jurisdiction in contro-
versies involving the location of county seats,'7 for these are
matters of local convenience merely; to interfere where the dis-
trict court had jurisdiction in the matter of the extension of
county boundaries, and even in the case of the location of elec-
tion precincts which did not seem necessary to the exercise of
the franchise but merely convenient.' They have refused to
exercise jurisdiction in the case of a controversy over the office
of chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee as the
same was not a public office. 19 They have refused to review
the action of the Board of Equalization -in the case of an indi-
vidual tax payer,2 and to aid an insurance company in obtain-
ing a permit to do business in the state."1
They have, in short, laid down the clear and explicit rule that
in order that their original jurisdiction may be invoked it is
necessary that:
"The interest of the state shall be primary and proximate,
not indirect or remote; peculiar perhaps to some subdivision of
the state, but affecting the state at large in some of its preroga-
tives; raising a contingency requiring the interposition of this
court to preserve the prerogatives and franchises of the state
'4 State ex rel. Steel v. Fabrick, (1908) 17 N. D. 532, 117 N. W. 860;
State ex rel. Buttz v. Lindahl, (1903) 11 N. D. 320, 91 N. W. 950; State
ex rel. Fosser v. Lavik, (1900) 9 N. D. 461, 83 N. W. 914; State ex rel.
Shaw v. Thompson, (1911) 21 N. D. 426, 131 N. W. 231.
15 State ex rel. Linde v. Hall, (1916) 35 N. D. 34, 159 N. W. 281.
16 Board of Control, State ex rel. Moore v. Archibald, (1896) 5 N. D.
359, 66 N. W. 234; State Board of Immigration, State ex rel. Baker v.
Hanna, (1915) 31 N. D. 570, 154 N. W. 704.
'r State ex rel. Walker v. McLean Co., (1903) 11 N. D. 356, 92 N. W.
385.
18 State ex rel. Byrne v. Wilcox, (1903) 11 N. D. 329, 91 N. W. 955.
19 State ex rel. McArthur v. McLean, (1916) 35 N. D. 203, 159 N. W.
847.
20 Duluth Elevator Co. v. White, (1903) 11 N. D. 534, 90 N. W. 12.
2Homesteader v. McCombs, (1909) 24 Okla. 201, 103 Pac. 691.
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in its sovereign character, this court judging of the contingency
in each case for itself. For all else, although raising questions
publici juris, ordinary remedies and ordinary jurisdictions are
adequate, and only when for some peculiar cause these are in-
adequate will the original jurisdiction of this court be exercised
for protection of merely private or merely legal rights." 22
It is quite clear indeed that in the instant case the majority
of the supreme court of North Dakota (and it is only fair to say
that Chief Justice Christianson and Associate Justice Birdzel
dissent) has performed a complete intellectual somersault.
Formerly the jurisdiction of the supreme court was never exer-
cised at the behest of a private individual, corporation or locality,
unless the interests of the state as a whole were concerned, as
in the contest over the office of a Judge who administered
the penal and civil laws of the whole state, or as in the case of
State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, where an illegal, state-wide
election was sought to be prevented, or State ex rel. Linde v. Hall,
where an equally unconstitutional referendum was involved, and
then only that the constitution might be made paramount. It
was even denied in cases of the removal of county seats. For-
merly it was held, or at least strongly intimated, that the consent
of the attorney general was absolutely necessary and though this
ruling was later modified, it was always held that the judgment of
the attorney general should be given much weight and should
only be overruled in matters of the gravest importance and of
state-wide significance. Now the attorney general is not only
not consulted but is himself enjoined and this on the relation of a
private bank and of a mere agent and servant of the State Bank-
ing Board of which the attorney general is himself a member.
Formerly, too, courts of equity were loath to pass upon com-
plicated statements of facts, and when there was any dispute as
to right or to title were wont either to require the issues to be
tried in a court of law and before a jury, or themselves to call
in a jury for advisory purposes, or to submit the matter to ref-
erees or masters in chancery to take testimony and to report. In
the instant case, however, the court decides a complicated matter
of accounting on affidavits merely and, without affording an
opportunity for cross-examination, sets aside the report of a
bank examiner and overrules the discretion of a governmental
department. ANDREW A. BRUCE.
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.
22 State ex rel. Steel v. Fabrick, (1908) 17 N. D. 532, 536, 117 N. W.
861; State ex rel. Linde v. Taylor, (1916) 33 N. D. 76, 156 N. W. 561;
State ex rel. McArthur v. McLean, (1916) 35 N. D. 203, 159 N. W. 847.
